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Gonna Party Like It’s 1899:
Party Systems and the Origins of Varieties of Coordination
Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank

Introduction
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, modes of business representation across the
capitalist democracies seem worlds apart. Despite pressures associated with
postindustrialization, the “macrocorporatist” Scandinavian countries maintain highly centralized,
national employers’ peak associations that engage in wage and policy-making negotiations with
highly centralized labor unions and government bureaucrats. In Germany and other continental
European countries, national employers’ associations have lost power in both political
representation and collective bargaining. But employers’ industry-level groups continue to
coordinate collective firm activities and to negotiate sectoral (often private) cooperative
agreements with their workers, or what we might call “sector coordination.” Finally, an aversion to
cooperation appears bred in the bone in the Anglo-liberal lands of Britain and the United States:
highly fragmented or “pluralist” associations organize employers and workers, and the
representation of business interests remains a highly individualistic affair.1
This article explores the origins of peak employers’ associations around the dawn of the
twentieth century to understand why countries produce highly centralized macrocorporatist
groups, weaker national associations but stronger industry-level groups, or highly fragmented
pluralist associations. We argue that government actors led in the creation of peak employers’
organizations; therefore, party competition had a significant impact on the evolution of the
associations into their mature institutional forms. The terms of political engagement (set by
party-system characteristics and state structure) influenced the political incentives of both public
and private sector leaders and shaped the evolution of employers’ organizational capacities.
First, the incentives for cooperation were much different in two-party systems than in
multiparty systems. In the former, large umbrella parties tended to include employers as well as
other social actors, employers were often dispersed across parties, and right parties could
reasonably hope to win electoral majorities and had little reason to compromise with the other
parties. In these cases there emerged a fragmented, pluralist system of business representation.
Countries with multiparty systems, however, were likely to have partisan organizations dedicated
to the interests of specific social groups (such as labor, business, and farmers), and each party
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had a political incentive to cooperate with the others in order to participate in the governing
coalitions. Moreover, these business-oriented parties recognized their limited chance to win an
electoral majority and sought to delegate policy-making power to social actors in private
institutions; they thus had a strategic reason for nurturing labor-market coordination.
In turn, a second political feature influenced the level of coordination: the degree of state
centralization versus federalism. Countries with strong national governments were more likely to
produce a national dedicated business party, which covered the interests of most companies and
served to develop the collective voice of business: these countries produced encompassing,
macrocorporatist employers’ associations. In federal countries, by contrast, diverse business
parties developed at the regional level and employer organizations remained fixed at the sectoral
level.
We also acknowledge other causes for employer organization: the structure of the
economy and features of labor (strength of labor militancy and levels of skills associated with
preindustrial guilds). Yet we argue that these explanations are bounded, as they suffer from
some inconsistencies, fit uneasily with the empirical data, and do not capture the full story. For
example, both high levels of labor militancy and strong norms of social cooperation are said to
spur cooperation in coordinated countries.2 But these motivations for coordination suggest quite
different relations between the social classes, and while guilds motivate cooperation to secure
collective goods, labor activism inspires defensive action to contain militancy.
Recognizing the causal salience of the structure of political competition supplements and
improves upon other theories of associational development in several ways. First, association
building at the industry level and at the national, multisector level relies on substantially different
processes. Economic structures, labor activism, and preindustrial cooperation are highly salient
for the evolution of sectoral or regional employers’ organizations. But national, multisectoral,
peak employers’ associations require a moment of disconnect in social life, in order to overcome
the high transaction costs of group formation beyond the industry level. Timing is also important
in that national patterns are solidified when regional economies and political communities
become incorporated into national and even global structures. As we demonstrate in our case
histories, the leadership for the development of peak employers’ associations came from
business-oriented party activists and bureaucrats seeking to advance industrial development
policy and to solve specific problems of political control. Business-oriented party leaders and
bureaucrats in both predemocratic and democratic regimes feared the rising tide of democracy
and labor activism. They therefore viewed the employer organization as a useful tool for political
control because it could secure parliamentary advantage and serve as a societal counterweight
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to working-class activism. Political leadership was vital to the emergence of these peak
associations, and the structure of political competition played a decisive role in the structure of
these groups.
Second, political agency becomes more important at those critical junctures where the
range of possible actions and impacts of outcomes are expanded and the structure of political
competition shapes the strategic choices of political actors. The dawn of the twentieth century
constituted a moment of enhanced opportunity for building institutions for labor-market
coordination. An ideology of cooperation gripped employers across the Western world during this
period. It was a time when national industrial development policies, highly organized peak
employers’ associations, and labor-market coordination came to be viewed as solutions to the
rise of national economies, the globalization of trade, and the need to transfer regulatory
privilege from agriculture to industry. While experiments in building peak employers’ associations
articulated very similar ambitions for high levels of nonmarket coordination, these parallel
experiments ultimately produced different organizational forms. And party competition played a
major role in producing these diverse outcomes.
Finally, as we have argued elsewhere, there is a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing
relationship between the spheres of industrial relations and political party competition.”3 Our
investigation of the historical circumstances surrounding the emergence of national patterns of
business organization helps to unravel the reciprocal influences of movement in the two spheres
and highlights the element of historical contingency that may be overlooked in less historically
grounded studies.

The Collective Organization of Business
This article questions why countries differ in their development of encompassing and
centralized national peak associations and in their broader levels of employer coordination. First,
some nations produce multisector and centralized national associations that minimize sectoral
disputes (what we call macrocorporatism); second, some create predominately sectoral level
and privately driven cooperative associations (sectoral coordination); and third, some develop
fragmented groups with considerable intrabusiness competition (pluralism).4
While peak employers’ associations and coordination had been relatively weak
everywhere at the end of the nineteenth century, divergence among nations along the paths of
macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, and pluralism were pronounced by the 1920s and more
so in the 1930s, even though full-blown macrocorporatist coordination did not develop until after
the Second World War.5 Table 1 documents this divergence in employer organization in the early
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decades of the twentieth century for sixteen (now advanced industrialized) nations. The table
reports the level of employer coordination on two core dimensions. First, a macrocorporatist
dimension captures the scope and centralization of national peak employers’ associations, their
policy-making authority, the corresponding density of labor organization, and collective
bargaining centralization. Second, a sector coordination dimension captures typical sectoral
cooperation on things such as training, research and development, and export marketing, as well
as the strength of long-term finance and producer relations. (See the appendix.)
The Scandinavian polities of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden and the Benelux nations
displayed increasingly strong macrocorporatist organization of employers (with moderate
sectoral cooperation) during the early decades of the twentieth century. The Germanic nations
and Italy exhibited moderate macrocorporatist employers’ organizations and strong sectoral
cooperation during this period. The Anglo-liberal polities (and Finland and France) were
characterized by pronounced pluralist employers’ organization: the development of
encompassing, centralized, and integrated national peak associations and sectoral coordination
remained low in these systems from the turn of the century until World War II.

Party Competition and the Origins of Employers’ Associations
Our central question is to understand why countries produced peak multisector
employers’ associations in the mold of macrocorporatism, sectoral coordination, or pluralism. We
argue that the structure of political competition shaped the strategic choices of employers and
sympathetic politicians and significantly influenced the development of the various forms of peak
employers’ associations. Both employers and party leaders or bureaucrats on the right had
incentives for forming encompassing employers’ associations. Yet structural features of party
politics—multiple versus two-party systems and federal versus centralized
governments—significantly determined the outcomes of these struggles to create collective
institutions.
Employers had incentives to develop national business organizations and other
nonmarket methods of coordination at the turn of the twentieth century to shift policy privilege
from agriculture to industry and to contain labor activism. Inspired by ideas of developmental
capitalism, they sought national rather than regional policy solutions to the challenges of (1)
industrialization, (2) state supports for competing in world markets and for protecting the home
turf from invasive imports, (3) arrangements to restrict the cut-throat competition of laissez-faire
capitalism, and (4) investments in skills.6
Politicians on the right in both democratic and predemocratic regimes also had incentives
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for nurturing encompassing national business associations during this period, as these groups
served several political purposes. Party leaders had electoral incentives to nurture groups that
would solidify their constituent base and to reach out to potential business constituents who
belonged to other parties but who shared the goal of advancing capitalist development.
Bureaucrats were motivated to organize employers to gain political support for help in passing
legislation or help in implementing public policies. Finally, political leaders sympathetic to
employers had incentives to delegate power to private forums, when they believed that those in
such nonlegislative arenas could more readily advance their policy ambitions and social class
constituency’s interests.7 Although the political authority was not transferred through democratic
elections, predemocratic political parties were important in parliaments; indeed, incentives for
leaders on the right to build up party power and to cultivate employers’ associations to bolster
their own political power may have been stronger in predemocratic regimes than in democratic
ones.8 While conservative elites worried about the working-class threat across systems, elites in
predemocratic regimes feared revolution.
Although party leaders and employers everywhere had a shared interest in business
organization, the specific forms of peak employers’ associations were deeply influenced by the
structure of party competition. Two political features, in particular, had a critical impact on the
strategic choices of party leaders in their institution-building efforts: the structure of parties (two
versus multiple parties) and the degree of federalism versus centralization.9
First, the number of parties mattered, in that multiparty systems are more likely than
two-party systems to produce dedicated business parties, to inspire cooperation among social
actors, and to delegate policy-making power to private channels. Multiparty systems have higher
coverage of specific groups, so that employers are more likely to belong to a single party. But as
discussed below, in federal systems of government, these dedicated business parties are likely
to remain regional. Dedicated national business parties inspire coordination, by focusing
attention on common goals among constituents and making credible promises to members;
consequently, their platforms do not fluctuate to appeal to the median voter, as occurs in
two-party systems.10 Coalition governments—usual in multiparty systems—further encourage
cooperation among competing interests (which must form governments) and stable policy
outcomes. Leaders of business parties under these conditions have incentives to delegate
policy-making authority to private channels, because they are unlikely to win electoral majorities.
Their constituents are more likely to secure favorable policy outcomes via direct negotiations
with workers than via parliamentary processes.
In comparison, two-party systems tend to consist of catchall parties that bring varied
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constituencies under the partisan umbrella. Employers may be dispersed among parties, and
parties may seek to cultivate competing business associations. When employers belong to
competing parties, they may feel that no single group speaks for them and may be more resistant
to government regulation than would be the case in countries where a dedicated business party
represents their interests. Employers in catchall parties are less likely to believe the policy
promises of party leaders, because parties’ positions fluctuate to attract the median voter; in
addition, even if a party follows through on its promises to employers, it may be voted out of
office in the next election and all will be lost.11 Party leaders in this system may be less willing to
delegate policy-making authority to private actors, because they are less identified with these
actors and because they have hopes of winning outright electoral victories. Thus two-party
systems tend to experience policy fluctuations and less stable regulatory climates for business;
the promises of politicians are less believable, government figures are less willing to delegate
authority, and employers have greater difficulty creating organizations for coordination.
A second feature of political engagement matters enormously to the formation of peak
employers’ associations—the level at which political competition is organized. Centralized
governments produce national, centrally organized, and regionally homogenous parties,
because the political action largely takes place at the national level. These countries tend to
engender well-organized corporatist associations as well. In stark contrast, parties and public
policies tend to vary materially and ideologically across regions in federal systems of government
with their decentralized political authority. This geographical variation engenders regionally
fragmented associations, because the region is the locus of much of the policy-making action.
While centralized party systems are more likely to produce class-based political cleavages,
federal party systems often divide the electorate along class, regional, religious, and/ or ethnic
lines and are more likely to include employers and workers within the same party. Thus, the
institutionalization of national versus regional parties has a feedback impact on social
structures.12
To sum up, the characteristics of partisan representation—the number of parties and their
degree of centralization—permit a rather simple parsing out of the worlds of business politics.
First, centralized, multiparty systems tend to produce encompassing and highly coordinated
corporatist associations with a high level of state involvement (macrocorporatism). These party
systems delegate significant policy-making authority to the peak associations, but industrial
relations systems retain a strong role for government, because employers trust that their
dedicated business parties will represent their interests in political channels.
Second, countries with two-party systems (either centralized or decentralized) tend to
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produce pluralist employer representation, in which no unitary peak group can claim to speak for
collective business interests. These party systems do not delegate much policy-making authority
to organized business and labor. That is because even when one party becomes significantly
linked to business (for example, the U.S. Republican Party in 1896), the business-oriented party
can hope to win an outright majority. In countries with centralized, two-party systems, the central
government may periodically seek to impose high levels of coordination on business and labor
(as in Britain), but the gains are then likely to be reversed when the opposing party gains power.
These countries, that is, may exhibit greater levels of coordination than countries with federal
two-party systems, but their experiments in coordination are time limited.
Third, federalist, decentralized multiparty systems are likely to produce high levels of
employer coordination at the industry level (sector coordination), but they have weaker peak
associations and less state involvement. Federal multiparty systems have difficultly producing
dedicated national business parties, because sectional cleavages remain salient. Moreover,
while business-oriented politicians have incentives to delegate political authority to social
partners, the absence of a single business party makes employers more resistant to state
oversight.
We present these theoretical predictions in Table 2 and denote four model groups of
countries that fit the type of party system and state structure for each combination of the two
factors. Space constraints of this article do not permit a full quantitative analysis of cross-national
variations in coordination. Nonetheless, our historical, qualitative case study material on four
prototypical countries helps substantiate our claims, and the simple “cross- tabulation” of political
institutional dimensions in Table 2 produces some suggestive information about our theoretical
predictions.13 Computing group means for the 1900–1938 country-decades (displayed in each
cell), one finds significant differences in average macrocorporatism and sector coordination
across multiparty and two-party systems (using a t-test for difference of means). Multiparty
systems and centralized polities have relatively high macro-corporatism with moderate sector
coordination while multiparty, federal systems have strong sector coordination and moderate
macrocorporatism. While both centralized and fragmented polities have low sector coordination,
centralized, two-party systems display modestly higher macrocorporatist employer organization
than federal, two-party systems.

Linkages between Party and IndustrIal Relation Systems
Certainly the structure of political competition was not the only determinant of variations
in employers’ multisector peak associations. In the following discussion we consider other factors
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that appear in the scholarly literature. While acknowledging their strengths, we also discuss their
limitations in capturing the entire story of business organization. In particular, we explore two
broad sets of variables—the structure of industry and the features of the working class. Finally,
we reflect on the interaction between these various theoretical arguments, paying particular
attention to the evolving complementarities between the structure of party and industrial relations
systems.
At the outset, we reject the proposition that national variations in employer organization
simply conformed to deep ideological and cultural norms. From the standpoint of the present,
nothing may seem surprising about macrocorporatism in Denmark, sectoral coordination in
Germany, and pluralism in Britain. Each country has its own foundation myth of the exceptional
circumstances that account for its trajectory in the pantheon of national permutations: think of
British regard for individual agency versus German affection for the state. Yet these patterns of
coordination—seemingly indelibly imprinted on national psyches—were much less distinctive a
century ago. The ideological underpinnings of nationalist industrial development and peak
employer organization were essentially the same across advanced nations and differed
fundamentally from countries’ earlier conceptions of collectivism. Moreover, ideological
determinacy fails to capture the peculiar ironies of national trajectories. The ancien régime
persisted in Burkean ideals of old Tory England and similarly struck a responsive chord with
German conceptions of organic society. Despite the importance of the state in German ideology,
Germany produced sectoral coordination with little state involvement, and the British conception
of a National Industrial Council after World War I inspired coordination across advanced
societies.14
One set of explanations attributes the variations in employer coordination to differences
in industrial structure that reflect the stage and type of capitalist development. Yet while
industrialization broadly accounts for the general timing of coordination, scholars hold diverse
views about national propensities to organize. In some accounts, early industrializers organize in
a “search for order” by forming sector trade associations or multisector umbrella organizations to
manage competition, to assist in rapid industrial growth, and to protect against risk. In other
accounts, late developers organized in order to catch up with their competitors.15 In like manner,
some view those firms seeking to compete in international arenas as having a greater need for
associations than domestic producers, because such associations offer collective support in
battling the common enemy of foreign firms. Yet other scholars view countries with fewer
exporting firms as having fewer wage pressures and therefore showing greater willingness to
grant higher wages to labor and to cooperate with it.16
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High levels of regional or sectional diversity also inhibit the development of
encompassing, centralized employers’ associations. Divisions over tariff reform, for example,
constrained the national, multisector organization of employers in Britain and manufacturing and
financial interests diverged dramatically over fiscal policy after World War I. Nevertheless,
employers overcame diversity more readily in some countries than in others. Thus, Maier argues,
British elites were more unified than German ones, due to the commercial needs of the landed
gentry and to British public education.17 But German employers managed to reconcile
differences between heavy and light industrial sectors in the face of democratic revolution after
World War I, when they created the Reich Association of German Industry, whereas British
employers at that time failed to produce a single encompassing employers’ association.
Another set of explanations for cross-national differences in levels of employer
organization points to (again contradictory) features of labor: employers organize either to resist
labor activism or to achieve collective provision of skills for their highly productive workers. Some
suggest that firms organize to stunt union militancy and that levels of business organization
reflect the strength of worker mobilization. Industrial unions reinforce solidarity among workers of
all skill levels and heighten capacities for cooperation with employers over training and wages;
craft unions, by contrast, pursue self-interested strategies that benefit upper strata workers and
motivate workers to control the numbers of people who may acquire the skills to practice a craft.
Strong ethnic and religious cleavages also diminish the incentives of both worker organization
and employers to organize.18 Other scholars argue that firms historically using highly skilled
workers were more likely to organize in order to provide collective training mechanisms and to
ensure labor peace. These skills levels were tied to preindustrial guild traditions, as guilds
facilitated vocational training systems, allowed firms to develop specific assets, and enabled the
development of a skills-based export sector.19
These theories seem instinctively true but rely on different underlying processes for
arriving at cooperative industrial relations. Each suffers from inconsistencies. Scholars attribute
high levels of business organization in Denmark both to a highly mobilized labor movement and
to a collectivist culture, yet it is hard to reconcile pitched warfare on the one hand with cozy
coordination on the other. Moreover, economic and labor differences between the liberal and
coordinated countries at the beginning of the 1900s are overstated; for example, large
companies in prewar Germany began developing firm-based strategies for building skills and
controlling labor that were similar to those advanced by their American counterparts.20
Attributing a high level of employer organization to the presence or absence of
preindustrial guilds is also somewhat problematic, in that guilds have a dual impact on
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associational life. They have an economic impact in producing high skills and nonwage
competition by employers, both of which foster cooperation; consequently, the decline of British
guilds led to a drop in both skills and solidarity.21 Guilds also have a political impact in
fragmenting political identities and inhibiting organization above the sectoral level; for example,
the fractious Danish guilds failed to organize until a leader of the Right Party (Højre) induced
them to join the manufacturers’ new multisectoral organization. In addition, craft unions elicited
different business responses: when strong Danish craft unions sought to wrest control over skills
from employers, firms organized at the national level to reclaim their managerial prerogative and
to stabilize patterns of industrial engagement. Yet strong craft unions in Britain worked against
multisector action, because employers shed skilled labor instead, and weak craft unions in the
United States allowed business to remain fragmented. Whereas Sweden and Denmark have
similar, highly corporatist peak employer associations, there are differences: Sweden has
industrial unions and Denmark has craft unions.22
Although we view industrial structure and labor arguments as having certain limitations in
capturing the full variation of employer organization, we certainly do not wish to dismiss these
explanations. Therefore, we offer four insights about the linkages between these industrial
structure, labor-oriented, and party system explanations.
First, the formation of business sectoral groups and national peak associations, in fact,
relies on substantially different processes in each case. Sectoral and regional cooperative
groups are motivated by specific labor-management conflicts or enabled by craft traditions of
collective skills provision.23 But national group formation presupposes political will, as an
enormous gulf divides a pluralist network of industry associations from a highly centralized,
capacious peak organization with substantial power over its constituent groups. With the
emergence of national industrial economies, local traditions for cooperation needed a major
reworking, and the context of political competition had a powerful impact on these great
transformations.
Second, one might be concerned that the very structure of party systems was closely
linked to economic cleavages, which also shaped business organization; in this way party
systems are endogenous. Cusack et al., for example, suggest that the variation in workplace
skills was an important determinant of the national adoption of proportional representation
electoral systems in the 1920s. We acknowledge that in many cases European political parties
emerged from economic interest groups; for instance, social democratic parties were created by
organized labor, conservative parties had deep connections to the landowning gentry, and many
economic cleavages were mirrored in partisan divides.24 At the same time, the relationship
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between economic and party structures is complicated, because religious and ethnic
cleavages—in addition to class cleavages—were significant sources of political parties. Thus,
potential cleavages needed to be expressed politically and interpreted in order to form the bases
for parties. Moreover, while many parties were created from the bottom up from economic
interest groups, others were created from the top down by factions in the legislature. The latter,
alternative route to party development diminished the importance of economic structure, by
introducing new factors and agency into the calculus of party development.25 Thus, the process
of party formation is itself a process of social construction and may reflect the idiosyncracies of
agency at historical junctures that then have lasting legacies for future political engagement.
Third, in the cauldron of late-nineteenth-century politics—with its attendant movements
toward national and even international industrial economies and expanded
democratization—partisan forms and institutions for labor relations were both evolving. We have
elsewhere referred to this as a “dynamic and mutually-reinforcing relationship between the
spheres of industrial relations and political party competition,” and Iversen and Soskice refer to
the linkage between the two spheres as coevolution. This relationship may well be an example of
what Capoccia and Ziblatt refer to as “reciprocal causality,” a matter for which an investigation of
historical circumstance can best shed light on the directionality of causal findings.26
Finally, the period from 1890 to the First World War was a critical juncture that presented
an opening for coordination: the political responses at that moment lay the groundwork for the
evolution of the future political economy. Just as liberalism swept through Europe in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, replacing mercantilism as the hegemonic ideology, an
impulse for cooperation seemed ubiquitous from the late nineteenth century until shortly after the
First World War. The organizing philosophy of nationalist industrial development inspired the
images and structures of industrialization, and national peak associations were a key component.
While the success of this new public philosophy depended, in part, on its congruence with older
philosophical traditions, political structure and agency had an indelible impact on national
responses at this critical moment.27
A weak version of our argument is that the preindustrial skills tradition defines the basic
cleavage between coordinated and uncoordinated business communities but that the political
features of nation-states (party structure and federalism) explain the differences in levels of
coordination, as is found between countries with macrocorporatism and sectoral coordination. A
stronger version of the argument suggests that political structures had a feedback impact on
economic development: two-party systems with little incentive to nurture strong national
employers’ associations rewarded employers who engaged in low-skills competition while
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hampering the establishment of future collective skills-building institutions.
To assess the effects of the structure of political competition on employers’ organization,
we offer comparative case studies of Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.
We employ these cases to demonstrate that the causal argument had its intended effect using
process tracing, or the careful temporal reconstruction of the cases. We identify intermediate
steps between cause and effect and use our qualitative data to construct analytic narratives to
reveal the underlying incentives to produce action.28
For each nation, we suggest that the political rules of the game will have foundational
impacts on association building. The structure of party competition will influence whether a
dedicated business party develops and business-oriented party leaders and bureaucrats should
be directly involved in the creation of the groups. The groups should all initially seek high levels
of coordination, and the incentives for government actors to delegate policy-making authority
should be shaped by party competition.

The Case of Denmark
The dynamics of partisan competition demonstrate how Denmark came to create a
macrocorporatist peak employers’ association that organized industrial relations with
government and labor at a very high level. First, the character of party organization—the
centralization of political competition within a multiparty system—led to the creation of a
dedicated business party. The Danish system of partisan representation included three main
parties (Højre on the right, Venstre for rich farmers, Social Democrats on the left) and a small
faction, Moderate Venstre. Højre was something of a cross-class party through the 1880s,
including most of the countries’ employers and government bureaucrats, as well as a large
number of the urban working class (ranging from 16 to 40 percent of the party constituents). But
a huge number of Højre working-class voters migrated to the Social Democratic Party during the
1890s, after legislation enabled the national party to be established in the late 1880s. Thus, by
the late 1890s Højre consisted mostly of employers and bureaucrats and struggled to represent
all employers, regardless of sectoral splits on economic questions of the day.29
Second, leaders of the cooperation-oriented faction of Højre helped to create the peak
employers’ association for their own political purposes—to unify its core industrial constituency.
The Employers’ Federation of 1896 (that became Dansk Arbejdsgiversforening, da) was founded
by Niels Andersen (a Højre member, and later party leader of parliament, and a construction
industry employer) and Vilhelm Køhler (a brick factory director) to show that Højre could produce
a middle-way politics between the older conservative legacy and the new social democratic
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challenge.30
Third, the employers’ federation sought to develop as a highly coordinated association, in
order to influence public policy, obtain the right to self-regulation, and gain industrial peace.
While many stress the group’s interest in labor peace, policy influence was equally important; for
example, in a commemoration of da’s first twenty-five years, the authors claimed that “the most
important evidence of the organization’s energy and vision was its contribution to the solution of
the question about insurance against workers’ accidents.”31 The left had proposed a major
workers’ accident insurance reform along the lines of the German model, with benefits tied to the
wage earner and controlled by a worker fund. The employers favored a citizen-based and
tax-financed alternative and Niels Andersen proposed that it be administered by a Labor
Insurance Council, rather than as either a direct state program or a private program. The
employers’ federation sought to unify all employers around its position and waged a campaign to
bring the handicraft sectors into the employers’ federation.32
The other central goal of the employers’ association was to achieve industrial peace. To
this end the federation issued a regulation stating: “No inequality between employers and
workers concerning the work relationship (including, for example, wages and performance)
should give rise to work stoppages from either side. This inequality should, instead, be settled
with a compromise or an arbitration.” Niels Andersen had to work to convince employers to
accept this vision of industrial peace, and the greatest resistance came from the iron industry, led
by S. C. Hauberg, who initially favored a politics of confrontation with labor. The Employers
Federation intervened in a labor dispute within the metal industry in 1897 and suggested a labor
court (Arbejdsdomstol) to avoid future strikes. Niels Andersen also sought to organize labor
during this episode, to promote its side of the progress in the iron industry conflict and to urge the
early labor organization (DsF) to play the same leadership role in negotiations that da was
attempting to do on the employers’ side. Scholars credit these actions with being largely
responsible for the centralized form of the Danish lo: indeed, employers actually organized at a
national level before Danish workers and the Employers’ Association ultimately succeeded in
getting the industrial court it wanted with its establishment of the Joint Committee of 1898
(Fællesudvalget af 1898).33
Fourth, both employers and their government allies feared that the employer voice would
be diluted after the parliamentary reform, due, in part, to the structure of multiparty competition.
Consequently, there was an incentive for business interests to seek to have policy-making
delegated to private channels of representation. Coming parliamentary reform threatened the
power of the Right Party (Højre), and a faction of the party determined that coordination with
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other parties and social actors was essential for maintaining its influence. Højre’s initial defense
against the rising social democratic challenge was to form a center-right alliance with the farmers’
party, Venstre. The result of this experiment was the loss of a quarter of the party’s members of
parliament in the 1892 and 1895 elections. Højre had already begun forming voting committees
among the electorate, and the employers’ association was akin to this earlier effort. The desire
for industrial self-regulation was also responsible for the very moderate line taken by employers
after winning a major trade battle, the “Great Lockout” of 1899. The September compromise
established employers’ control over the organization of work and transferred power over labor
policy to the social partners, while retaining a supervisory role for government.34
Finally, the resolution of the conflicts surrounding the origins of the employers’
associations created important policy legacies: the dedicated business party Højre would remain
closely connected to the employers’ association, and the social partners would collaborate in
collective bargaining and policy negotiations with the state at a highly centralized level. The
impact of business unity within the party on the evolution of a collective voice of business within
the employers’ association is made clear by the sequence of events following the introduction of
full proportional representation in 1915. With the advent of PR, Højre was reorganized into the
Conservative People’s Party, becoming an even purer business party than it had been by the
1890s. This political consolidation of the nation’s employers reduced regional differences among
industrialists and enabled a stronger centralization of authority within da in the 1919, when all
vestiges of regional distinctions were removed and the organization was reorganized along
functional lines.35

The Case of Britain
The dynamics of partisan competition also demonstrate how Britain came to create
fragmented, pluralist employers’ associations, despite enormous efforts to the contrary. While
employers, labor, and the state periodically sought to develop capacities for coordination
(explaining why Britain appears somewhat corporatist at various times in its history), these efforts
were repressed in the dynamics of two-party competition.
First, given that Britain lacked a dedicated business party in its largely two-party system,
employers were dispersed across parties. Initially, more industrialists belonged to the Liberal
Party; but the party also included ideological proponents of liberalism and many workers.
Employers began to migrate to the Conservative Party or to the splinter Liberal Unionist faction
when the Liberal Party was rent asunder by the Irish Question in 1886; however, the
Conservatives also did a poor job meeting business needs. While the Liberal ideological
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commitment to liberalism made the party adverse to industrial development policies, the
Conservatives, albeit more open ideologically to old Tory notions of organic coordination, had
ties to the landed gentry and to financial interests that led them to block policies beneficial to
industrialists. Before the war (in 1914), ninety-four manufacturers were members of the House of
Commons: sixty-four of these were Liberals and thirty were Unionists; eighty-one members from
commerce and finance were divided nearly equally among the parties. After the war the
Conservatives became the “bosses party.”36 The prewar partisan divisions among employers did
not merely play out along industrial sector lines as even firms within industry were divided on the
tariff issue, and the issue of Home Rule worked against easy reconciliation of employers’
interests. By 1901 a majority of employers (apart from those who produced staples products and
financial interests) came to support protection, and even many cotton industrialists wanted some
tariffs. While the Labor Party was also beginning to emerge during this period, it largely voted
with the Liberals and supplanted the Liberal Party altogether after the Great War, thus preserving
the structure of two-party competition.37
Second, the role of two-party competition initially helps to explain the absence of a
national-level British employer organization at the end of the nineteenth century, when
employers elsewhere were moving to form national organizations. Employers were distributed
electorally between the Conservative and Liberal Parties and lacked a forum in which to consider
their broader collective political interests. Moreover, neither party was motivated to organize a
national business organization from the top down to serve its electoral needs.
Yet a national peak association (the Federation of British Industries, or FBI) was finally
organized during the First World War, when partisan infighting and the lack of coordination
became intolerable, and the long arm of the state had a role in its creation. While the FBI was
officially organized by industrialist Dudley Docker, there is considerable evidence that
Conservative Party activists, and especially Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, were deeply involved.38
Docker had been quite close to Steel-Maitland since the latter ran for office in 1906; for example,
Docker offered to lend Steel-Maitland one or two of his Daimler cars during the 1906 campaign.
Docker was the only “considerable subscriber” in Steel-Maitland’s reorganized East Birmingham
Conservative Association in 1914 and Steel-Maitland was on the verge of joining the board of
Docker’s company when he was offered the job of Under Secretary of the Colonies in 1915.
Steel-Maitland and Docker had a scheme for privately training Birmingham men as officers, a
scheme that Docker would finance, but it ran into difficulty with the military command. Finally, in
November of 1915, a few months before the FBI organizing meeting, Docker and Steel-Maitland
had a secret correspondence, hand carried by a Mr. Malcolm, “who is perfectly confidential.”39
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The Conservatives were motivated to form FBI, in part, to seek organizational help in their
battles with the Liberal Party; for example, they asked the FBI to support locating a department to
control commercial intelligence in foreign countries within the Foreign Office. The FBI was also
asked to weigh in on a plan for reconstruction and, in particular, to support the Conservative
desires to sustain economic stimulus over the Liberal Party’s priority (in keeping with its close
ties to financial interests) for protecting the pound in foreign monetary exchange. Steel-Maitland
was deeply interested in social and economic coordination and wanted desperately to unify
British employers and labor in the common cause of creating a domestic production machine that
would match the needs of the war effort, sustaining the party’s imperial ambitions, and
supporting its highly articulated vision of industrial development policies. Finally, the creation of
the FBI should be viewed as a constituency-building exercise and a logical continuation of
SteelMaitland’s broader campaign to expand the network of local conservative groups. He
implemented this campaign during his tenure as party chair and described himself as “a party
manager with an intelligence service through the country!”40 In this vein, he wrote to Bonar Law:
The war has obliterated many old Party distinctions. . . . Classes have joined in
the prosecution of the war and the true national view for the future must be that
new questions, new differences of opinion, new groupings of men may arise,
while those who have often combated one another over the old questions may
find themselves largely in sympathy over the new.41
The Foreign Office was determined to make the FBI work and lent Roland Nugent and
Guy Locock to FBI to help the association mobilize its constituency. At the first annual meeting
Dudley Docker emphatically recognized the enormous contribution of government bureaucrats,
stating: “Perhaps I may be allowed to say here how greatly we were indebted in the early days to
Mr. Tait for the assistance he gave in the formation of this association. . . . Next, we come to Mr.
Nugent, whom, you will remember, the Foreign Office were kind enough to allow to come to us
and who has filled the post of director and secretary . . . in an extremely able manner.”42
Third, the organizers of the employers’ association initially had ambitions for a high
degree of coordination among business, labor, and the state, wanted considerable industrial
policy-making to be delegated to the private sector, and sought to model itself after the Swedish
peak employers’ federation. At the first annual meeting the FBI’s founder, Dudley Docker,
explained: “One of the principal objects with which the Federation has been formed is to
command the attention of the Government of this country when framing industrial legislation. In
regard to which we shall hope to be of some service, not merely to manufacturers, but to the
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community as a whole.”43 As occurred in Denmark, Docker wanted substantial industrial
policy-making authority to be delegated to the private sector, sought to create a “Business
Parliament” for making industrial policy, sorely regretted Britain’s lack of a dedicated political
party for manufacturers (feeling that the Liberals, in particular, had failed to respect industrialists),
and wanted “to transform Britain into a model corporatist state.” As the Globe (owned by Docker)
expressed in an editorial entitled, “The Party or the State?”: “The party system has been carried
on to unnecessary lengths” such that it has “become deliberative only in name. . . . It is the
reason why so much of our legislation is inefficient, even when not injurious, to our commercial
interests.”44
Fourth, the FBI’s corporatist ambitions were diminished by party politics. Neither party
could speak definitively for business, and both parties (and warring governmental departments)
cultivated their own set of employers. Just as the Conservatives cultivated the Federation of
British Industries, Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Board of Labor nurtured a group called
the National Conference of Employers’ Organisations (drawn from the former free-trade
contingent), and the two groups competed for power. The FBI’s corporatist ambitions were also
thwarted by limited party incentives to cede policy-making privilege to organized business and
labor—each party hoped to win a majority through legislative channels. Business and labor
initially supported cooperation through the National Industrial Conference, yet Parliament
refused to delegate authority to an industrial council. At this point the employers’ and labor
organizations came to believe that cooperation was impossible: neither side wished to cede
control over industrial relations unless it felt that it would have some input into the process.45
Unlike in Denmark, where a system of self-regulation was created with the development of the
corporatist business and labor organizations, the British state retained firm control over industrial
relations.
Finally, the failure of these early efforts to significantly develop labor-market coordination
gave way to a heightened state of class conflict and deep skepticism about government solutions.
Party politics so disgusted employers that “coalitionists” from both major parties (dominated by
employers) contemplated forming a Centre Party. The electoral rules and path dependencies of
the party structure prevented the emergence of a new party, but the experiment reflects the
depth of disappointment with the current system.46 Viewing German coordination with great
admiration, Winston Churchill, famously remarked, “We are organised for nothing except party
politics.”47 Although Britain later tried to achieve coordination, liberalism was renegotiated at
each developmental juncture due both to legacies of earlier failures in cooperative experiments
and to the type of partisan conflict inherent in two-party systems.
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The Case of Germany
It is puzzling that Germany, with its strong state tradition, came to create a system of
sectoral coordination in which the social partners largely develop and implement labor-market
policy without much input from the state. We suggest that the dynamics of federal, multiparty
competition contributed to the emergence of a medium level of industrial coordination in
Germany: the weak and regionally diverse nature of party competition produced business parties
at the regional level but not at the national level. Immediately before the German revolution in
1918, business-oriented bureaucrats were motivated to unify employers into a peak association
and to delegate power to labor-market partners, in order to stave off more radical parliamentary
reforms. This effort produced the Reichverband. Yet with the continuing absence of strong
parties during the Weimar years, employers remained skeptical of their political representation
by the party system and struggled to retain private control over industrial relations. In addition,
without a unifying dedicated business party (similar to the Danish Conservative People’s Party),
the German national peak association never managed to unify diverse constituencies (as
happened with the Danish peak association after 1919). With the rise of the National Socialist
Party, the state essentially took over industrial life; but after the war employers lobbied to return
industrial relations to a private system of sector coordination that resembled the Weimar system.
First, the federal multiparty system in Germany gave rise to business-oriented parties in
the nineteenth century but did not produce a single, national dedicated business party; rather,
parties drew uneven support across regions and employers remained dispersed across parties.
The Law of Association forbade centralized political parties in Prussia until 1899 and local parties
were only loosely connected to parliamentary parties. Strong regional economic differences also
worked against both dedicated business parties and unitary peak employers’ associations:
heavy industry and agricultural estates favored protection, while lighter, export industries favored
free trade. And these conflicts played out in bureaucratic struggles.48 Yet even when trade
divisions began to diminish and even though some parties (such as the National Liberals)
counted both heavy and light industrialists among their members, the federal nature of the
German political system constrained the emergence of parties with broad national representation.
After World War I and the revolution, politicians tried to develop more organized, clearly defined
parties, yet employers remained dispersed among the diverse right parties. The Weimar parties
splintered so much that by 1929 there were twenty-nine parties in the Reichstag, and of those
only nine had legislative influence.49
Second, as happened elsewhere, business-oriented bureaucrats were heavily involved in
the creation of the peak employers’ associations and were motivated by their own political
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purposes. The story played out a bit differently in Germany than it did in Denmark, for example,
because bureaucrats rather than party leaders took the lead after World War I and were
motivated by the very weakness of parties to seek other sources of political support. An initial
effort at association building happened in 1876, when Wilhelm von Kardorff, a close friend of
Bismarck’s and member of parliament from the small manufacturers’ Free Conservative Party,
formed the Central Association of German Industrialists (Centralverbund Deutscher Industrieller,
or cvI) to advance tariff reform and to build support for tariff candidates in the upcoming
election.50 Kardorff ’s widely publicized pamphlet, “Against the Current,” was influenced by the
American Henry Carey, who also inspired Lincoln’s national development policies; Kardorff
described the political links of the association in his correspondence with Carey. In October 1878
the coalition of industrialist and agrarian protectionists won a majority in the Reichstag, and in the
December 1878 election, aided by the Centralverbund, protectionist voters turned out in heavy
numbers.51 The Centralverbund was very much an association for large industry. Consequently,
Liberal politicians, who were closer to the free-trade, consumer-product wing of business, sought
in the 1890s to create a source of countervailing power in the Bund der Industriellen. Liberal
politician Gustav Stresemann spearheaded the effort to expand the Bund into a national
association.52 This dual structure resulted in employers being dispersed across parties, industrial
sectors, regions, and associations.
German bureaucrats tried periodically to unify employers and assisted in creating the
Reich Association of German Industry (RDI) in 1919 by uniting the two existing groups. Motivated
to sustain wartime economic coordination and to stave off threats of revolution, corporatism was
viewed as an alternative to socialism. But without much party leadership, bureaucrats rather than
party politicians guided the association building. There was considerable infighting between the
Centralverbund and BdK sides (represented by Stinnes and Stresemann) and Stresemann was
vetoed by Hugenberg and Stinnes from joining the directorate. One of the new managers of the
Reich Association, Hermann Bucher, came directly from the German Foreign Office, and Joseph
Koeth (a successor of Walter Rathenau in the Raw Materials Division of the Prussian War
Ministry) came from the Demobilization Office. Koeth wanted to delegate policy-making privilege
to business and labor and believed that industrial committees should be allowed to regulate
themselves.53
Third, a desire for coordination motivated the development of the rdI. The intensive needs
of the German war machine motivated the formation of institutions for coordination during World
War I and quasi-public corporations (Kriegswirtschaftsgesellschaften) were formed to organize
production in each industrial sector. The architect of the German war economy, Walter Rathenau,
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had a vision for peacetime reconstruction along the same lines. Every industry was to integrate
firms into an association and all associations would belong to a national group that would
(sometimes with labor) engage in self-government. Although Rathenau was forced out of power
and later assassinated, his ideas inspired the creation of cooperative cartels. Negotiations for
cooperative peacetime policies between business and labor (the Stinnes-Legien Accord) began
in 1917, even before the German revolution.54
Fourth, fearing a revolution, business-oriented bureaucrats and employers sought to
have public policy-making delegated to private organizations. Worried about the possibility of
major losses in legislative struggles, employers concluded that economic democracy was
preferable to socialism. German industrialists were on the defensive after the war and viewed
corporatism as the means to regain some power. Jakob Reichert (Union of German Iron and
Steel Industrialists) explained his disdain for Junkers and the middle class, and remarked: “Allies
for industry could be found only among the workers.”55 But the German peak association never
managed to achieve the strength of the parallel Danish organization. In Denmark the
reorganized Conservative People’s Party included most employers and helped to unify the
political voice of business; subsequently, the employers’ federation reorganized along functional
lines. In Germany the absence of a single dedicated business party constrained the emergence
of full-blown macrocorporatism. Employers continued to be distributed across parties (such as
the Democratic Party, the Catholic Center Party, the German People’s Party, and the German
National People’s Party). Party politics hampered the business-labor effort to plan for postwar
contingencies, led employers to distrust the party system, and contributed to considerable
infighting within the rdI over leadership and policy. The high hopes for the Reich Association of
German Industry failed to pan out, as the organization remained a rather loose-knit peak
association and real decision-making power was retained at the lower, sector level.56 Thus a
leader in the organization, Paul Silverberg, stated in 1922 that the Reich Association was
“nothing other than a really loose peak association, which can impose very few rules on its
members, branch associations and individual firms, can commit them to nothing, and in which
there is a lot of talking.”57

The Case of the United States
We have fully reported the American story elsewhere and, therefore, will note only briefly
that the structure of two-party competition in the United States also dashed hopes for high levels
of coordination among employers.58 First, the United States failed to develop a dedicated
business party, although the Republican Party at the end of the nineteenth century often seemed
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to speak for employers. While American manufacturers in the Northeast and Midwest were
Republicans, industrialists in the South and West voted Democratic, as they did not wish to
participate in a party with African Americans and were bitter about the war.
Second, Republican Party activists were deeply involved with the development of the first
national umbrella association in the United States, the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM).59 The McKinley campaign sought to mobilize employers through the nam in order to reach
across partisan lines to promote his candidacy in the 1896 election and to augment support for
the party’s industrial policy agenda. NAM’s creators viewed the business organization as an agent
for political nationalization and a vehicle for organizing manufacturers across sectional divides.
The New York Times recorded the most significant event at nam’s second annual meeting as
“the applause which greeted a mention of the name of Major McKinley. This applause told as
plainly as could a preamble and resolution the real purpose of the delegates.”60
Third, NAM’s initial policy positions reflected a vision of industrial cooperation that
resembled positions taken by European employers: the association lobbied for a department of
commerce and—in true corporatist fashion—wanted to be licensed as the legitimate spokesman
for employers in cooperative business-government arrangements.61
But, fourth, party politics—dynamics of regionally dominated two-party
competition—worked against the realization of NAM’s corporatist aspirations. Congressional
representatives from the South and West voted against nam’s legislative proposals (such as the
formation of a department of commerce and the granting of a national charter to the association),
because they viewed these policies as advantaging Eastern and Midwestern manufacturers. Left
without its anticipated central role in managing the transition to industrial capitalism, NAM started
to wither away at the end of the century and only gained new life when it reconstituted itself as an
organization devoted to fighting organized labor in 1903. Finally, this critical juncture signaled a
setback for coordination in the American political economy and strengthened the liberal impulse
among U.S. employers.

Conclusion
The seeds of capitalist organization were sown at the end of the nineteenth century,
when employers and their government collaborators struggled to transform the regulatory
environment to privilege industry over agriculture. To this end, organizers in both the state and
the private sector sought to develop high levels of coordination among the social partners, with
the result that associations of the social partners were important actors in the break with the
preindustrial structures of the ancien régime. Yet some countries produced macrocorporatism, in
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which the economic and political activities of business and labor were highly coordinated,
nationally focused, and endowed with significant state support. Others delivered a system of
sector coordination, in which coordinated industrial relations were largely left under the control of
private channels of self-governance by the social partners. Finally, in some countries employers
had great difficulty finding common ground, had fewer political reasons to negotiate with labor,
and formed fragmented “pluralist” groups.
We have argued that because leadership for association building came from the state,
the political rules of the game were crucial to outcomes. The structure of party competition and
state centralization shaped incentives for strategic coordination for both political actors and
employers. Dedicated business parties were likely to develop in countries with multiparty
systems and strong centralized governments, and regional business parties developed under
conditions of multiparty competition and federal governmental structures. In these countries,
where no single party was likely to gain power, parties had an incentive to nurture private
associational channels for policy-making, and these produced macrocorporatist groups and
systems of sectoral coordination. Two party systems had electoral incentives to cultivate
business constituencies; but lacking a dedicated business party and incentives to delegate
power, business groups remained pluralist and highly fragmented.
These insights into the origins of peak employers’ organization also have implications for
the origins of corporatism and pluralism. While employers of various industrial nations all sought
institutions for coordination at the dawn of industrial capitalism, they had profoundly different
success rates that reflected the political climate in which they waged the struggle to project their
industrial goals. We suggest that the resolution of the political conflicts at the birth of associations
had a lasting impact on industrial relations, national systems of regulation, and the future
potential for coordinated competitive strategies: cross-national variations in employers’
association led to fundamentally different patterns of business engagement with the state for a
century to come.
This work has significance for our understanding of institutional innovation. We subscribe
to a punctuated-equilibria model of institutional change, in which the resolution of political
conflicts at critical junctures creates lasting institutional legacies. Yet while we appreciate the
important role for agency in these transitional moments, we move beyond agency to theorize the
political structural constraints on strategic action. In this way, we endorse other recent work that
accords a primary place to political parties,62 while focusing rather more on the structure of party
competition that shapes agency.
Our research also has important theoretical implications for the understudied construction
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of business preferences for economic and social policies. Comparative scholars often assume
fundamental differences in firms’ preferences within coordinated and liberal market economies,
and trace these preferences back to preindustrial guilds.63 While we accept that images of
industrialization are influenced by older estate and guild traditions, we also view interests as
socially constructed and receptive to politics.64 Thus, while the scant research on the origins of
employer organizations usually attributes causality to industrial development or working-class
mobilization, we add political structural determinants. Moreover, while scholars commonly root
political party development in the structure of societal cleavages, we emphasize the inverse, by
looking at how parties influence the construction of class cleavages.65
Thus, the work also has bearing on the evolution of diverse forms of industrial capitalism,
as it addresses an important pillar in the institu- tional underpinnings in the varieties of capitalism.
With our hitherto untold story about the political origins of national associations, we reveal that
stylized facts and an absence of dialogue between business historians and students of party
politics have left us rather blind to the enormous importance of political structures in the evolution
of corporate cooperation. Patterns of political engagement (even in pre-democratic regimes), as
well as protocorporatist structures, matter, and incentives for both state and labor-market actors
contribute to cross-national variations in peak business groups. Politics as well as economics
has a role in the origins of models of capitalism.
Finally, the analysis has important real-world implications for social solidarity and equality.
Americans often take as a given the current spirit of atomistic individualism; yet if one believes in
the reconstructive powers of associations and electoral politics, hope may yet remain for those
who seek cooperative collective action to address the challenges of postindustrialization. Like
Nixon opening China, employers—if given a forum to articulate their collective interests—could
help build support for public policies to enhance human capital. An essential concern is whether
the institutions for coordination that developed during the golden age of manufacturing can
survive in the postindustrial age. States must respond to changing economic conditions and cure
earlier welfare traps; yet their ultimate success in continuing to provide collective social goods
may depend on their ability to build new coalitions of broad majorities. For these reasons, it is
essential that we understand the historical context of the construction of coalitions and
institutions that support both economic efficiency and social solidarity.

Notes
1. Martin and Swank 2004; Martin and Thelen 2007; Hicks and Kenworthy 1997;
Hoepner 2007.

23

Martin, Swank

2. Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2004; Due et al. 1994; Galenson 1952.
3. Martin and Swank 2008, 14; see also Iversen and Soskice 2009.
4. While we focus in this article on the structure of encompassing and centralized
national peak organizations, we conceptualize coordination more broadly as including two
other related dimensions: the degree to which peak associations are integrated into
governmental policy-making processes and the predominate mode of economic coordination
in the economy. These dimensions are closely related and we elsewhere investigate all
aspects of employers’ coordination with quantitative methods. Where encompassing and
centralized national associations develop and are integrated into state policy-making forums,
coordination is national in scope and state involvement in cooperative institutions is
extensive. When peak associational organization is moderate, cooperative institutions are
driven by predominately private endeavors and occur at the subnational (primarily economic
sectoral) level. Finally, low formal peak organization and policy-making representation
correspond to market-based coordination of the economy.
5. While in some post–World War II macrocorporatist nations, foundational
institutions were not created until the 1930s or later (Katzenstein 1985), in others,
protocorporatist institutions were established by 1910 (Crouch 1993).
6. Bensel 2000.
7. Martin 1994; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Maier 1975.
8. All political elites on the right feared greater democratization and cultivated
constituencies to thwart the working-class challenge: the Danish Right Party created
conservative clubs and worker electoral groups in the 1880s (Dybdahl 1969) and in Germany,
Stresseman sought the expansion of the National Liberal Party. The Danish head of state
was not allowed to take action if both bodies of parliament stood against a proposal, and the
lower body held budgetary responsibility and was democratically elected by proportional
representation. In Germany the Prussian Parliament wielded considerable authority:
Bismarck worked with the National Liberal Party to pursue his goals of nation-building and
with the small Free Conservative Party to pass tariff legislation (Lambi 1962, 68–69; Klug
2001, 244).
9. See discussion of these in Martin and Swank 2008.
10. Cusack et al. 2007; Kitschelt 1993.
11. Downs 1957.
12. Coleman 1987; Hawley 1966; Amorin and Cox 1997; Manow and van
Keesbergen 2007; Chhibber and Kollman 2004.

24

Martin, Swank

13. For a full quantitative analysis, see Martin and Swank 2010.
14. Wehler 1970, 140; Bruun 1931; Blackbourn and Eley 1984; Lowe 1978.
15. Hawley 1996; Bradley 1965; Lynn and McKeown 1988, 2–3; Baldwin 1990;
Gershenkron 1962; Gourevitch 1986.
16. Davenport-Hines 1988; Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1985; Galenson 1952.
Moreover, Britainindustrialized quite early, and many British firms experienced significant
trade pressures and supportedprotective tariffs by the end of the nineteenth century;
therefore, one might have anticipated greatersupport for national organization (Trentmann
1996; Klug 2001, 219, 236).
17. Tolliday and Zeitlin 1991; Burgess 1975, 305; Turner 1984, 6–7; Maier 1975, 41.
18. Korpi and Shalev 1979; Crouch 1993; Stephens 1979; Clegg et al. 1889; Thelen
2004; Manow and Van Kersbergen 2007.
19. Galenson 1955; Unwin 1966; Thelen 2004; Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007;
Swenson 2002.
20. Dunleavy and Welskopp 2007; Spencer 1979, 62; Sweeney 2001.
21. Unwin 1966. Zeitlin 1990 suggests that British skills remained high through the
First World War.
22. Agerholm and Vigen 1921; Det faglig arbejdsbevaegles; David 1970; Galenson
1952.
23. See recent work by Kuo 2010 on the various motivations for employer
organization and the conditions under which associations take a positive or negative
approach toward labor relations.
24. Lipset and Rokkan 1967.
25. Manow and Van Keesbergen 2007; Duverger 1954.
26. Martin and Swank 2008, 14; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Capoccia and Ziblatt
2010.
27. According to a punctuated-equilibria model of institutional change, decisions
made at critical junctures establish enduring path dependencies; Orren and Skowronek 2004;
Wehler 1970, 140; Bruun 1931.
28. Mahoney 2010.
29. As a member of Parliament put it in 1895, members “might very well be
protectionists or free traders, sympathizers of co-operative societies as well as opponents of
cooperative societies” (Dybdahl 1969, 6–12, 17).

25

Martin, Swank

30. Dybdahl 1969; Agerholm and Vigen 1921; Nielsen n.d.
31. Agerholm and Vigen 1921, 5, translated by Cathie Jo Martin.
32. Andersen 2006; da – Korrespondance, General udgånde 1896 6 30 til 1899 9 21,
Erhvervsarkivet, Aarhus.
33. “Vedtægter for Arbejdsgiverforeningen af 1896”; Agerholm and Vigen, 6–47; da to
iron industry. Letter. 1897. 46-48, June 23, 1897; da to DsF. Letter. 1897._52 July 12,1897;
1898_138 22/3/1898; Due et al. 1994, 77–79.
34. Vigen 1946; Petersen 1979, 218; Due and Madsen n.d., 26; Due et al. 1994, 80–
81.
35. Dybdahl 1969, 12; Galenson 1952; Beretningen om Dansk
Arbejdsgiversforenings Virksomhed, 1927–28.
36. Guttsman 1963, 40–41, 88–89, 104; Ridings 2001, 771; Turner 1984, 3–4; Garst
1999, 800.
37. Burgess 1975, 305; Turner 1984, 9; Phillips 1981, 167–68; Fraser 1962, 60, 66–
67; Dutton 1981, 879.
38. Blank 1973; Davenport-Hines 1984; Nettl 1965; Grant and Marsh 1977.
39. Docker, D., to Steel-Maitland n.d.; Steel-Maitland to Docker 1/10/1916;
Steel-Maitland to Docker. May 24, 1915; Davenport-Hines, 55-56, 63; correspondence in
ASM GD193/GD166/2; D Docker to ASM, November 13, 1915.
40. Nugent to Peter Rylands, January 18, 1917; Nugent. “Exerpt from letter to Mr.
Docker of 27th March, 1917. Reconstruction Scheme; Cline 1970, 168; Arthur Steel-Maitland
to Lord Milner, February 19, 1910; ASM letter to McKenna, August 16,1915.
41. Steel-Maitland to Bonar Law, November 16, 1917.
42. “Company Meeting. Federation Of British Industries.” March 12, 1917: 12.
43. “Company Meeting. Federation Of British Industries.” March 12, 1917: 12.
44. Turner 1984, 33–39; Davenport-Hines 1984, 83.
45. Turner 1984, 34–35; Macara 1921; Lowe 1978, 668.
46. “Concern about Indemnities.” May 15, 1919: 14; “A Centre Party Coalition.” May
14, 1919: 13.
47. Alderman 1984, 144.
48. Ritter 1990, 27, 44; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998; Herrigel 1996; Forbes 1979, 331–
39.
49. Klug 2001, 232–33; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998, 328; Pollock 1929, 861–78; Kocka
1999, 42.

26

Martin, Swank

50. Eley 1978, 327–51; Dawson 1904, 15–16; Böhme 1967, 230–31.
51. Kardorff to Carey, Philadelphia; Lambi 1962, 67; Craig 1978, 87; Klug 2001, 244.
52. Tipton 1977, 850–51.
53. Bunn 1958, 284; Wolff-Rohe 2001; Brady 1942, 72; Gatzke 1954, 51;
Mierzejewski 2002, 202; Feldman 1975; Maier 1975, 62.
54. Redlich 1944, 321; Lauterbach 1944, 29–30; Bowen 1947, 159; Rogers and
Dittmar 1935, 483–84
55. Maier 1975, 15, 40–59, 59.
56. Turner 1969, 58; Wolff-Rohe 2001; Gatzke 1954, 51; Rogers and Dittmar 1935,
483–84.
57. Cited in Mierzejewski 2002, 202.
58. Martin 2006.
59. NAM 1926; Gable 1959; Martin 2006.
60. New York Times. 1896. “Manufacturers Cheer for McKinley.” (January 22): 1.
61. Search 1900, 12–13.
62. Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.
63. Hall and Soskice 2001; Estevez-Abe et al. 2001.
64. Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1985.
65. Duverger, Lipset, and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini 2000.
66. Further details and data sources for these measures are available in an electronic
appendix, at http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/faculty_swank.shtml.

Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the following institutions and individuals for their support for
and insights into this project: the Radcliffe Institute, the Helen Way Klingler College of Arts and
Sciences at Marquette University, the Danish Social Science Research Council, the Institute of
Advanced Study at Warwick University, the Erhvervsarkivet (Aarhus Denmark), the Modern
Records Centre (Warwick, University), Baker Library (Harvard Business School), the National
Archives of Scotland, Patrick Bernhagen, Marius Busemeyer, Giovanni Capoccia, Peter Munk
Christiansen, Samantha Fang, Jeffrey Fear, Wyn Grant, Jørgen Fink, Alex Hicks, Torben Iversen,
Geoffrey Jones, Tim Knudsen, Morten Larsen, Peter Lohmann, Rodney Lowe, Jim Milkey,
Gerhard Ritter, Neil Rollings, David Soskice, Kathleen Thelen, and participants at seminars
series at Aarhus University, University of Aberdeen, Boston University, Copenhagen Business
School, Duke University, Harvard Business School, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard Center

27

Martin, Swank

for European Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Notre Dame, Oxford
University, Southern Danish University, the University of Warwick, and the Wissenschaftzentrum
Berlin.

28

Martin, Swank

References
Agerholm, Sophus, and Anders Vigen. 1921. Arbejdsgiver Foreningen Gennem 25 Aar, 1896–
1921. Copenhagen: Langkjaers bogtrykkeri.
Alderman, Geoffrey. 1984. Pressure Groups and Government in Great Britain. New York:
Longman.
Amorin, Octavio, and Gary Cox. 1997. “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and Number
of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 41, no. 1 (January): 149–74.
Andersen, Lars. 2006. “Ulykkesforsikringen og den danske model 1890–1930.” Nyhedsbrev for
Netværk for Nordisk Velfærdsstatshistorie, no. 28 (December): 2–13.
Baldwin, Peter. 1990. The Politics of Social Solidarity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bartolini, Stefano. 2000. The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860– 1980. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Beer, Samuel. 1957. “The Representation of Interests in British Government: Historical
Background.” American Political Science Review 51, no. 3 (September): 613–50.
Bensel, Richard. 2000. The Political Economy of American Industrialization. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Berk, Gerald. 1994. Alternative Tracks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bindslev, Alfred. 1937–38. Konservatismens Historie i Danmark, vols. 2–3. Odense, Denmark:
Kulturhistorisk forlag.
Blackbourn, David, and Geoff Eley. 1984. The Peculiarities of German History. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Blank, Stephen. 1973. Industry and Government in Britain. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.
Böhme, Helmut. 1967. “Big-Business Pressure Groups and Bismarck’s Turn to Protectionism,
1873–79.” Historical Journal 10, no. 2: 218–36.
Bowen, Ralph. 1947. German Theories of the Corporatist State. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Brady, Robert. 1942. “Modernized Cameralism in the Third Reich.” Journal of Political Economy
50, no. 1 (February): 65–97.
Buun,Ronald.1958.“Codetermination and the Federation of German Employers’ Associations.”
Midwest Journal of Political Science 2, no. 3 (August): 278–97.
Büeck, Henry Axel. 1906. Der Centralverband deutscher industrieller und seine dreissigjährige
arbeit von 1876 bis 1906. Berlin: Guttentag.
Burgess, Keith. 1975. The Origins of British Industrial Relations. London: Croom Helm.
Capoccia, Giovanni, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2010. “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A
New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond.” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8–

29

Martin, Swank

9: 931–68.
Chanady, Attila. 1967. “The Disintegration of the German National People’s Party 1924–1930.”
Journal of Modern History 39, no. 1 (March): 65–91.
Clarke, P. F. 1972. “The End of Laissez Faire and the Politics of Cotton.” Historical Journal 15,
no. 3 (September): 493–512.
Clegg, Hugh, Alan Fox, and A. F. Thompson. 1964. A History of British Trade Unions since 1889.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Close, David. 1973. “Conservatives and Coalition after the First World War.” Journal of Modern
History 45, no. 2 (June): 240–60.
Colman, William D. 1987. “Federalism and Interest Group Organization.” In Herman Bakvis and
William M. Chandler, eds., Federalism and the Role of the State. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press: 171–87.
Craig, Gordon Alexander. 1978. Germany, 1866–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cronin, James. 1983. “Labor Insurgency and Class Formation.” In James Cronin and Carmen
Sirianni, eds., Work, Community and Power. Philadelphia: Temple University Press: 20–
48.
Crouch, Colin. 1990. “Trade Unions in the Exposed Sector.” In Renato Brunetta and Carlo
Dell’Aringa, eds., Labour Relations and Economic Performance. New York: New York
University Press.
———. 1993. Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon.
Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007 “Economic Interests and the Origins
of Electoral Institutions.” American Political Science Review 101 (August): 373–91.
Cuthbert, D. D. 1971. “Lloyd George and the Conservative Central Office.” In A. J. P. Taylor, ed.,
Lloyd George: Twelve Essays. London: Hamish Hamilton.
DA

to DsF. Letter. 1897_52 12/7/1897; 1898_138 22/3/1898, DA - Korrespondance, General
udgående 1896 6 30 til 1899 9 21.

DA

to iron industry. Letter. 1897_46-48, 23/6/1897, DA – Korrespondance, General udgående
1896 6 30 til 1899 9 21.

Daunton, M. J. 1996. “How to Pay for the War.” English Historical Review 111, no. 443
(September): 882–919.
Davenport-Hines, R. P. T. 1984. Dudley Docker: The Life and Times of a Trade Warrior. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
David, Edward. 1970. “The Liberal Party Divided 1916–1918.” Historical Journal 13, no. 3
(September): 509–32.

30

Martin, Swank

David, Peter. 1975. “The Liberal Unionist Party and the Irish Policy of Lord Salisbury’s
Government, 1886–1892.” Historical Journal 18, no. 1 (March): 85–104.
Dawson, William. 1904. “The Genesis of the German Tariff.” Economic Journal 14, no. 53
(March): 11–23.
Docker, Dudley, to Arthur Steel-Maitland. November 13, 1915. ASM Papers. GD193/165/2/124.
Docker, D., to Steel-Maitland, no date. ASM Papers GD193/128/231.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.
Due, Jesper, and Jørgen Steen Madsen. n.d. “Hvorfor er den danske aftale model anderledes en
den Svenske.” FAOS Forskningsnotat, #26.
Due, Jesper, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Carsten Strøby Jensen, Lars Kjerulf Petersen. 1994. The
Survival of the Danish Model. Copenhagen: DJOEF Publishing.
Dunleavy, Colleen, and Thomas Welskopp. 2007. “Peculiarities and Myths: Comparing U.S. and
German Capitalism.” German Historical Institute Bulletin, no. 41 (Fall): 33–64.
Dutton, D. J. 1981. “The Unionist Party and Social Policy 1906–1914.” Historical Journal 24, no.
4: 871–84.
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.
New York: Wiley.
Dybdahl, Vagn. 1969. Partier og Erhverv. Aarhus, Denmark: Universitets Forlaget i Aarhus.
Eley, Geoff. 1978. “Reshaping the Right: Radical Nationalism and the German Navy League,
1989–1908.” Historical Journal 21, no. 2 (June): 327–54.
Feldman, Gerald. 1969. “The Social and Economic Policies of German Big Business, 1918–
1929.” American Historical Review 75, no. 1 (October): 47–55.
———. 1975. “Economic and Social Problems of the German Demobilization, 1918–19.” Journal
of Modern History 47, no. 1 (March): 1–47.
Fraser, Peter. 1962. “The Liberal Unionist Alliance: Chamberlain, Hartington, and the
Conservatives, 1886–1904.” English Historical Review 77, no. 302 (January): 53–78.
Fulcher, James. 1991. Labour Movements, Employers, and the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Galenson, Walter. 1952. The Danish System of Labor Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Garst, W. Daniel. 1999. “From Sectoral Linkages to Class Conflict.” Comparative Political
Studies 32, no. 7 (October): 788–809.
Gatzke, Hans. 1954. “The Stresemann Papers.” Journal of Modern History 26, no. 1 (March):
49–59.
Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1966. Bread and Democracy in Germany. New York: H. Fertig.

31

Martin, Swank

Gollin, Alfred. 1983. “Review of British Economic and Strategic Planning 1905– 1915.” Albion: A
Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 15, no. 3 (Autumn): 259–65.
Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Grant, Wyn, and David Marsh. 1977. The Confederation of British Industry. London: Hodder and
Stoughton.
Guttsman, W. L. 1963. The British Political Elite. New York: Basic Books.
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hansen, Hal. 1997. “Caps and Gowns.” Ph.D. diss, University of Wisconsin.
Hawley, Ellis. 1966. The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Hazlehurst, Cameron. 1971. Politicians at War, July 1914–May 1915. London: Jonathan Cape.
Herrigel, Gary. 1996. Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Hicks, Alex, and Lane Kenworthy. 1998. “Cooperation and Political Economic Performance in
Affluent Democratic Capitalism.” American Journal of Sociology 6 (May): 1631–72.
Hoepner, Martin. 2007. “Coordination and Organization: The Two Dimensions of Nonliberal
Capitalism.” Discussion Paper no. 07/12. Cologne: Max Planck Institute for Social
Sciences.
Huber, Evelyne, Charles Ragin, and John Stephens. 1993. “Social Democracy, Christian
Democracy, Constitutional Structure and the Welfare State,” AJS 99, no. 3: 711–49.
Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2009. “Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the
Nineteenth Century.” World Politics 61, no. 3 (July): 438–86.
Jaggers, Keith, and Ted Robert Gurr. 1996. POLITY III: Regime Change and Political Authority,
1800–1994. [computer file] (Study #6695). 2nd ICPSR version.
Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1993. “Class Structure and Social Democratic Party Strategy.” British Journal
of Political Science 23 (July 3): 299–337.
Klug, Adam. 2001. “Why Chamberlain Failed and Bismarck Succeeded.” European Review of
Economic History 5: 219–50.
Kocka, Jurgen. 1999. “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German
Sonderweg.” History and Theory 38, no. 1 (February): 40–50.
Korpi, Walter, and Michael Shalev. 1979. “Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in
Capitalist Societies.” British Journal of Sociology 30, no. 2 (June): 164–87.

32

Martin, Swank

Kuo, Alexander. 2010. “Political Origins of Firm Strategies.” Paper presented at the Seventeenth
International Conference of Europeanists, Montreal, April 15–17.
Lambi, Ivo. 1962. “The Protectionist Interests of the German Iron and Steel Industry, 1873–1879.”
Journal of Economic History 22, no. 1 (March): 59–70.
Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with
Application to Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1: 3–27.
Lauterbach, Albert. 1944. “Economic Demobilization in a Conquered Country.” Journal of Politics
6, no. 1 (February): 28–56.
Levine, Daniel. 1978, “Conservatism and Tradition in Danish Social Welfare Legislation, 1890–
1933.” Comparative Studies 20, no. 1 (January): 54–69.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan, 1967. “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and
Voter Alignments.” In Lipset and Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments.
New York: Free Press: 488–509.
Lowe, Rodney. 1978. “The Failure of Consensus in Britain: The National Industrial Conference.”
Historical Journal 21, no. 3 (September): 649–75.
Macara, Sir Charles. 1921. Recollections. London: Cassell and Company.
Mackie, Thomas, and Richard Rose. 1974. The International Almanac of Electoral History. New
York: Free Press.
Mahoney, James. 2010. “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research.” World
Politics 62, no. 1 (January): 120–47.
Maier, Charles. 1975. Recasting Bourgeois Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Manow, Philip, and Kees Van Kersbergen, eds. 2009. Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare
States. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Marrison, A. J. 1983. “Businessmen, Industries and Tariff Reform in Great Britain, 1903–1930.”
Business History 25, no. 2 ( July): 148–78.
Martin, Cathie Jo. 1994. “Business and the New Economic Activism.” Polity 27, no. 1 (Fall).
———. 2006. “Sectional Parties, Divided Business.” Studies in American Political Development
20, no. 2 (Fall): 160–84.
Martin, Cathie Jo, and Duane Swank. 2004. “Does the Organization of Capital Matter?”
American Political Science Review 98, no. 4: 593–612.
———. 2008. “The Political Origins of Coordinated Capitalism: Business Organization, Party
Systems, and State Structure in the Age of Innocence.” American Political Science
Review 102, no. 2: 181–98.
———. 2010. “The Political Origins of Varieties of Coordination: Party Competition and the Birth

33

Martin, Swank

of Peak Associations and Non-Market Coordination.” Paper presented at the
Seventeenth International Conference of Europeanists, Montreal, April 15–17.
Martin, Cathie Jo, and Kathleen Thelen. 2007. “The State and Coordinated Capitalism:
Contributions of the Public Sector to Social Solidarity in Postindustrial Societies.” World
Politics 60, no. 1 (October): 1–36.
Mierzejewski, Alfred. 2002. “Der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie 1919– 1924/25.”
Enterprise and Society 3, no. 1 (March): 202–3.
Ministry of Transportation. “Niels Christensen Monberg.” At http://www.trm .dk/sw14784.asp.
NAM.

1926. “Reports of Officers: Annual Address of President Edgerton.” Proceedings of the
Thirty-first Annual Convention of the National association of Manufacturers of the United
States of America. New York: NAM.

New York Times. 1986. “Manufacturers Cheer for McKinley.” January 22: 1.
Nielsen, Charles. n.d. Ydby skriver i Sydthy Årbog om:Polarforskeren Knud Rasmussen,
Etatsråden og Ydby Missionshus. Cites Niels Andersen letter to “De kongelige ordenes
kapitel. At http://www.cm1.dk/Charles.html.
Nugent to Peter Rylands, 1/18/1917.
Nugent. “Exerpt from letter to Mr. Docker of 27th March 1917. Reconstruction Scheme.”
Orren, Karen, and Stephen Skowronek. 2004. The Search for American Political Development.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Petersen, Jan Nørgaard. 1979. “Brydninger I Højre 1894–1901.” Historie/Jyske Samlinger, Bind
Ny række 13 (1979–81): 4.
Phillips, Gregory. 1981. “The Whig Lords and Liberalism, 1886–1893.” Historical Journal 24, no.
1: 167–73.
Platt, D. C. M. 1968. Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815– 1914. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Pollock, James. 1929. “The German Party System.” American Political Science Review 23, no. 4
(November): 859–91.
Redlich, Fritz. 1944. “German Economic Planning for War and Peace.” Review of Politics 6, no. 3
(July): 315–35.
Ridings, Eugene. 2001. “Chambers of Commerce and Business Elites in Great Britain and Brazil
in the Nineteenth Century.” Business History Review 75, no. 4 (Winter): 739–73.
Ritter, Gerhard. 1990. “The Social Bases of the German Political Parties, 1867– 1920.” In Karl
Rohe, ed., Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. New York: Berg: 27–52.
Rogers, Lindsay, and W. R. Dittmar. 1935. “The Reichswirtschaftsrat.” Political Science

34

Martin, Swank

Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December): 481–501.
Search, Theodore, 1900. “President’s Report.” In Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Convention of
the National Association of Manufacturers Boston, MA (April 24, 25, 26, 1900).
Philadelphia: National Association of Manufacturers Bureau of Publicity.
Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. 1998. “Parties and Interests in the ‘Marriage of Iron and Rye.’” British
Journal of Political Science 28, no. 2 (April): 291–332.
Steel-Maitland, Arthur, to Lord Milner. February 19, 1910. ASM Papers, GD193/147/1/11-12x.
———, to Dudley Docker. May 24, 1915. ASM papers GD193/165/1/538.
———, letter to McKenna, August 16, 1915. ASM papers GD193/164/3/1/54.
———, to Dudley Docker. January 10, 1916. ASM Papers GD172/1/3.
———. November 16, 1917. Memo attached (GD193/99/2/148) to letter to Bonar Law
(GD193/99/2/147).
———. March 1919. “Scheme for the Reform and Development of the Consular and Commercial
Diplomatic Services.” In D. Cameron Watt, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs:
Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, vol. 1, pt. 2, series K.
University Publications of America Doc. 7: 32.
Stephens, John. 1979. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. London: Macmillan.
Thelen, Kathleen. 2004. How Institutions Evolve. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Times. 1899. “Conciliation and Trade Disputes.” March 22: 14.
The Times. 1916. “Commercial Counsellors.” December 16: 5.
The Times. 1917. “Company Meeting: Federation Of British Industries.” March 12: 12.
The Times. 1919a. “A Centre Coalition Party.” May 14: 13.
The Times. 1919b. “Concern about Indemnities.” May 15: 14.
Tipton, Frank. 1977. “Der Bund der Industriellen by Hans-Peter Ullmann.” Journal of Economic
History 37, no. 3 (September): 850–51.
Torcal, Mariano, and Scott Mainwaring 2003. “The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party
Competition.” British Journal of Political Science 33 (January): 55–84.
Trentmann, Frank. 1996. “The Transformation of Fiscal Reform.” Historical Journal 39, no. 4
(December): 1005–48.
Turner, John. 1984. “The Politics of Business.” In John Turner, ed., Businessmen and Politics.
London: Heinemann.
Unwin, George. 1966. The Gilds and Companies of London. London: Frank Cass and Co.
“Vedtægter for Arbejdsgiverforeningen af 1896.” (Vedtagne pågeneralforsamlingen 25/8/ 1897)
DA - lovmateriale 1896–1914.)

35

Martin, Swank

Vigen, Anders. 1946. Arbejdsgiver Foreningen Gennem 50 Aar 1896–1946. Copenhagen:
Langkjærs Bogtrykkeri.
Watt, D. Cameron. 1997. “Economic Affairs, Cultural Propaganda, and the Reform of the Foreign
Office, 1910-1939.” British Documents on Foreign Affairs, pt. 2, series K. Washington,
D.C.: University Publications of America.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. 1970. “Bismarck’s Imperialism, 1862–1890.” Past and Present 48 (August):
119–55.
Wolff-Rohe, Stephanie. 2001. Der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie 1919– 1924/25.
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
Zeitlin, Jonathan. 1990. “The Triumph of Adversarial Bargaining.” Politics and Society 18, no. 3:
381–404.

36

Martin, Swank

Appendix
Table 1 reports the level of employer organization in two ways. First, along the
macrocorporatist dimension, we report a continuous index of formal organization and
representational articulation. Our measure is an additive index of three component measures: (1)
scope of employers’ organization (that is, the share of employers organized in national peak
associations; (2) the centralization of power (for example, control over strike/lockout funds,
bargaining strategies) in national peak associations; and (3) the integration of national
associations into national policy-making forums. Each country-decade is scored 1, 2, or 3 (where
1 is minimal and 3 is high) on each component dimension. While one could infer with confidence
that high levels of organization correspond with macrocorporatist coordination, and intermediate
levels equate with sectoral coordination, we actually compute broader indices for
macrocorporatist coordination and sectoral coordination.
For macrocorporatism, we combine our index of employer organization with a directly
comparable measure of labor organization and collective bargaining centralization. As the
correlation between this measure and our focal measure of employers displayed in Table 1 is
very high (r = .95), we utilize only the employers measure for the present illustration of
macrocorporatist organization.
Second, we report an additive index of sector coordination, which is composed of similar
1–3 scaled measures of the extent of sector coordination to provide (commonly within economic
sectors) collective business goods (that is, training, research and development, export marketing,
and industrial development strategies) and the strength of long-term finance and producer
relations (that is, reliance on bank finance and institutional bank-producer linkages). Both
macrocorporatism and sector cooperation indices are expressed as standard (z) scores to
facilitate comparison.66
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Appendix A – Tables
Table 1: Patterns of Employers’ Organization: Macrocorporatism and Sector
Coordination, 1900-1938

SOURCES: See text and appendix for details on measures of macrocorporatism and sector coordination.
Detailed information and data sources for all component of these measures are available at
www.marquette.edu/polisci/fculty_swank.shtml.
a
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Table 2: Political Institutions and Employers Organization at the Dawn of the
Twentieth Century: Theoretical Predictions, Nations, and Modes of
Organization
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